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Does economics make you selfish?∗
Daniele Girardi†, Sai Madhurika Mamunuru‡, Simon D. Halliday§, Samuel Bowles¶
Abstract
It is widely held that studying economics makes you more selfish and politically
conservative. We use a difference-in-differences strategy to disentangle the causal
impact of economics education from selection effects. We estimate the effect of four
different intermediate microeconomics courses on students’ experimentally elicited
social preferences and beliefs about others, and policy opinions. We find no dis-
cernible effect of studying economics (whatever the course content) on self-interest
or beliefs about others’ self-interest. Results on policy preferences also point to little
effect, except that economics may make students somewhat less opposed to highly
restrictive immigration policies.
1 Introduction
The concern that ‘economics makes you selfish’ is widely held. From opinion pieces
in The New York Times (Bauman 2011) to popular broadcasts on the US National
Public Radio (NPR) (Vedantam 2017) and the BBC (Stafford 2013), mass media has
popularized the idea that studying economics has a detrimental effect on generosity and
cooperativeness. Similarly, the argument goes, studying economics may also promote
policy opinions typically considered conservative (Stigler 1959; Colander 2005; O’Roark
and Wood 2011).
There is some evidence (cited in the next section) that economics students are more
conservative and self-regarding than their peers. But an important unresolved question
is to what extent this reflects differential selection into economics rather than a causal
effect of economics education.
To address this question we use a transparent difference-in-differences strategy to
identify the causal effect of a one-semester intermediate microeconomics course on stu-
dents’ social preferences and policy opinions. We administered an online survey at the
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beginning and at the end of the semester to five classes – four intermediate microeco-
nomics classes and one non-economics class as a control. We used a Trust Game (TG),
a triple Dictator Game (DG) with charities in the role of receiver, and two incentivized
tasks eliciting subjects’ expectations about the behavior of others in the same games.
Subjects’ behavior in these games provides a measure of the extent to which an in-
dividual deviates from the (Nash-equilibrium) prediction of self-interest (which we term
deviation from self interest, or DFSI). Our belief-elicitation tasks measure the extent to
which subjects expect others to deviate from self-interest. We also included questions
eliciting students’ policy preferences on topics such as economic and environmental reg-
ulations, trust in government, market efficiency, and immigration.
Our sample includes undergraduate students enrolled at the University of Mas-
sachusetts Amherst. The intermediate microeconomics courses include two courses fol-
lowing a standard curriculum. Because we know that differences in course content can
have substantial long term effects on social and political attitudes (as documented, for
example, by Cantoni et al. 2017, who study a recent curriculum reform in Chinese
schools) we also look at the possible effects of different content of the economics courses.
Our sample also includes students in an intermediate microeconomics course that, while
listed in the course catalogue as identical to the conventional courses, devotes substan-
tial attention to a variety of other topics: social preferences, asymmetric information,
incomplete contracts, game theory, fairness and Pareto-efficiency as normative criteria,
the benefits of cooperation (e.g. in commons tragedies), and competition. We call this
course Post-Walrasian.1 We also include students in a fourth course that is predomi-
nantly conventional but with some exposure to social preferences. Our control subjects
are in a large course on nutrition.
We find that a one-semester intermediate microeconomics course has little to no effect
on experimental measures of social preferences or on expectations about other people’s
social preferences. Our estimates of the effect on measures of altruism and reciprocity
are close to zero and do not differ across the differing content of the courses. We also
find little evidence of an effect on the students’ policy preferences or political orienta-
tions. The one exception concerns immigration: studying intermediate microeconomics
(whatever the course content) seems to make students less opposed to highly restrictive
immigration policies.
2 Economics and Preferences: Theory and Evidence
Theoretically, studying economics might shift behavior towards self-interest through
three main mechanisms: exposure, moral wiggle room, and reducing cognitive disso-
nance.
First, consider the powerful effect of mere exposure. By exposure we mean the
introduction to and repeated interaction with an idea. In particular, a student learns
about self-interest in economics courses, and is repeatedly shown the many ways in which
1 The course was taught by one of the authors of this paper (Girardi) using the pre-publication draft
of a textbook written by two of us (Bowles and Halliday).
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rational, self-interested actors behave (and is not similarly exposed to other ways in which
people – or other relevant economic agents – might behave). The effect of exposure
on social learning has been well documented (Zajonc 1965; Murphy and Zajonc 1993;
Murphy, Monahan, and Zajonc 1995; Birch and Marlin 1982). Presenting self-interest as
the norm for human behavior might thus have the unintended effect of making students
more likely to adopt that norm themselves.
Second, given what they learn, economics students may be provided moral wiggle
room for what they would otherwise consider immoral behavior, and a way to reconcile
their own self-interest with a positive self-concept (Mazar, Amir, and Ariely 2008; Dana,
Weber, and Kuang 2007). How might learning microeconomics produce these results?
In microeconomics, students learn to demonstrate that in a perfectly competitive mar-
ket, the non-cooperative pursuit of self-regarding preferences results in a Pareto-efficient
equilibrium. This may provide a moral and social justification for self-interested behav-
ior. A student who believes that self-interest promotes efficiency will be able to maintain
a positive and pro-social self-perception while at the same time acting selfishly, when
she would otherwise see self-interest as immoral or contrary to social norms (Gino, Ayal,
and Ariely 2013; Shalvi et al. 2015; Dana, Weber, and Kuang 2007).
Finally, it has long been recognized in social psychology that actions can affect pref-
erences as part of a cognitive dissonance reduction response (Festinger 1957; Ariely and
Norton 2008). The ‘effort justification’ variant of this body of theory proposes that,
as Xiao and Houser (2018) put it ‘when one engages in a strenuous activity that one
would not typically choose, one develops the perception that the activity is attractive in
order to justify the effort.’ By this reasoning, the effort that economics students spend
choosing a strategy to maximize their payoff in a game, or a level of output to maximize
the profits of a firm, or their market basket to maximize their self-regarding utility, could
induce a shift towards more self-regarding preferences.
Empirically, a substantial literature has appeared in support of the idea that economists
are more self interested.2 There is also some (more limited) evidence that economists
tend to hold more conservative policy preferences.3 These studies do not identify a
causal impact of studying economics, as distinct from a selection effect concerning who
chooses to study economics.
A much smaller set of papers has addressed our question, namely, is there a causal
effect of the study of economics on social values and policy preferences? Two identifica-
tion strategies have been deployed. The first is to observe students’ attitudes or behavior
over time, contrasting those in economics courses with those taking other courses. Frey
and Meier (2003) study (real-world) giving behavior of students in economics and other
courses over their period at university. They find no evidence that studying economics
reduces contributions. Bauman and Rose (2011), using a similar design, find no evi-
2 Included are Marwell and Ames (1981), Carter and Irons (1991), Wang, Malhotra, and Murnighan
(2011), Frank, Gilovich, and Regan (1993) and Rubinstein (2006). A few studies have instead found
economists to be more generous or less opportunistic than others (Yezer, Goldfarb, and Poppen 1996).
Konow (2019) shows that providing ethics instruction to students taking an economics course can increase
generosity, though economics and business majors are less generous on average than other majors.
3 For example O’Roark and Wood (2011) and Colander (2005).
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dence that taking economics courses reduces the contributions of economic majors to
a public interest group. However, they find a negative effect on the contributions of
non-economics majors who take economics courses.4
The second strategy is to implement a controlled experiment, briefly exposing ran-
domly selected subjects to economic concepts or language, and a control group to an
exposure that is otherwise similar but unrelated to economics, and then observing the
difference in the before-after measures of interest. Ifcher and Zarghamee (2018) ran-
domly assign some experimental subjects to the treatment – economics exposure – by
means of language affirming “(1) that all individuals are self-interested and (2) that
all individuals attempt to maximize their payments.” Subjects then play incentivized
games. The authors find that compared to subjects exposed to non-economic language,
the exposure to economics shifts behavior towards self-interest.
In another experiment, Molinsky, Grant, and Margolis (2012) asked mid-career busi-
ness leaders acting as “managers” to convey to a “subordinate,” some bad news, for ex-
ample reassignment to an undesirable location or dissatisfaction with the subordinate’s
job performance. Immediately prior to this, managers had been randomly selected to
create a sensible phrase from a scrambled bunch of words, some of which contained eco-
nomic content (for example, in unscrambled form: “analyse costs and benefits”), and
some that did not (the control). In communicating the bad news to the subordinate the
managers who had been exposed to the economic words experienced less empathy and
conveyed less compassion to the subordinate than did those in the control group.
Our study belongs to the strand of literature that uses a difference-in-differences
approach, comparing medium-term changes in students’ behavior and beliefs among
those with a sustained exposure to economics teaching and those without. The two
other studies of this type (Frey and Meier 2003; Bauman and Rose 2011) measure
a single outcome – giving behavior – in a natural setting. Our study draws upon a
wide range of incentivized experimentally-elicited behaviors and beliefs, and measures of
political orientation and policy opinions. Moreover, we are the first to study the effects
of different course content.
3 Research design
We administered an online survey at the beginning and at the end of the semester to a
group of undergraduate students enrolled in four intermediate microeconomics courses
and one non-social science course. The survey includes questions on personal character-
istics and policy preferences, and four economic games with real monetary stakes – a
4 An earlier exercise with a similar logic is briefly presented in Frank, Gilovich, and Regan (1993,
p. 168). They administer two questions concerning an ethical dilemma to students in two introductory
microeconomics courses and an astronomy course, at the beginning and at the end of the semester.
Different from the other studies reviewed here, no material incentive is involved. Results are presented
informally through a histogram, suggesting that economics students display some differential movement
towards less honest responses, but no formal statistical test is performed. This exercise can be seen as
a precursor to the difference-in-difference studies described here.
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Trust Game (TG), a Triple Dictator Game with charities (DG), and two belief elicitation
questions about the behavior of others in the same games.
We use these to obtain individual-level measures of ‘deviation from self-interest’
due to generosity and reciprocity, and beliefs about the social preferences of others.
Participants completed the survey at a time of their convenience from a link in our
invitation email.
3.1 Sample and courses
Students from four different intermediate microeconomics courses and from one course
outside of the social sciences comprise our sample. A course in ‘Nutrition and Metabolism’
serves as a control non-economics course. The economics courses vary: two courses
(which we call Conventional I and Conventional II) are fairly standard intermediate
microeconomics courses using Pindyck and Rubinfeld (2012) and Perloff (2011); a third
(Post Walrasian) course uses Bowles and Halliday (2020) and focuses on strategic interac-
tions and contractual incompleteness alongside standard topics of optimization (crucially
it contains behavioral experiments and models of social preferences); finally, the fourth
course (Conventional plus social preferences), is an online course using Frank (2008).
The four intermediate microeconomics courses all had the same enrollment prerequisites
and identical description in the online enrollment system.
Figure 1 clarifies why we hypothesize that different economics courses could lead
to different outcomes. It shows the location of the textbooks used in the intermediate
microeconomics courses under investigation in a simplex covering three important and
over-arching ideas in modern economics (Bowles et al. 2019 refer to these ideas as “meta-
topics” as they are aggregations of underlying sets of topics).5 The location of a given
textbook within the simplex identifies a book’s relative emphasis. For example, Pindyck
and Rubinfeld (2012) and Perloff (2011) place their emphasis on market structure and
competition. Varian (2014), by way of contrast, puts greater emphasis on individual
constrained maximization, whereas Bowles and Halliday (2020) places a greater weight
on strategic interactions, contractual incompleteness, and bargaining.
With respect to the content of each book, one can also compare the coverage of how
economists conceive of and teach preferences. In each book, a model of constrained utility
maximization is the main model of individual decision-making. Frank (2008) and Bowles
and Halliday (2020) teach standard self-interested preferences while also explaining the
evidence for alternatives to self-interest, such as altruism, difference aversion, conditional
cooperation, and so on. Both books explain the evidence from results in experimental
economics that underlie the alternative models of preferences.
5 Specifically, Bowles et al. (2019) use topic modeling – a machine learning algorithm used to analyze




The survey administered to our sample includes standard demographic and academic in-
formation, questions eliciting students’ policy opinions, incentivized choice experiments
(economic games), and incentivized belief-elicitation questions regarding a subject’s be-
liefs about the behavior of others in the same games. The wording of all the policy
questions is available in Appendix A.4, with topics covering immigration, the function-
ing of markets, government regulation, and climate change.
The survey asked participants to play four incentivized games: a Triple Dictator
Game (DG), a Trust Game (TG), and two belief-elicitation tasks about the behavior of
other participants in these games. The order in which the two games were presented
was randomized: each participant was equally likely to play the DG first or the TG first.
After completion of the survey, we randomly selected one of the four games for payment.
In the Triple Dictator Game (DG) with charities the respondent is allocated $10 and
given the possibility to donate a portion to a local non-profit charitable organization
from a list of three. The list included non-partisan, non-controversial, and apolitical
organizations. Any amount donated would be tripled.6
We then ask the subject to guess the average contribution of the other participants.
The subject’s payoff depended on how close they were to the actual average: their
payoff was $12 minus the absolute value of the guessing error. The guessing error is
defined as the difference between a subject’s guess and the average donation of all other
respondents.
In the Trust Game (TG), participants are anonymously and randomly paired (Berg,
Dickhaut, and McCabe 1995). Within each pair, one player is randomly assigned the
role of first mover, while the other is the second mover. The first mover is allocated $10.
She must transfer a share of this $10 of her choice to the second mover (the amount sent
may be zero if the first mover chooses so). The first mover is also informed that whatever
she sends will be tripled by the experimenter. Once the first mover chooses a value, the
experimenter will triple it and transfer it to the second mover. The second mover is then
told to make a similar choice: transfer some share of the now-tripled money back to the
first mover (the amount given back may be zero, should the second mover choose so).
Subjects played the games asynchronously with matching occurring later. Each
subject specified how they would play both roles (first mover and second mover) and
we used the strategy method for the case of the choices as the second mover. Each
participant was therefore asked to specify (1) how much they would send as first mover;
(2) how much they would send back as second mover for each possible transfer of the
first mover in whole numbers.
To determine payoffs, each participant was then (after completion of the surveys)
6 This matching subsidy creates a strong incentive for altruistic individuals to donate through the
experiment. This addresses a major concern with the DG with charities: in the absence of matching,
altruistic participants might personally send a share of their payoff to the same charity or a different
one post-experiment (Knowles and Servátka 2015, p. 57). It is also consistent with Dictator Games run
alongside Trust Games in previous literature (Ashraf, Bohnet, and Piankov 2006).
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randomly paired with another participant.7 In each pair, one was randomly selected
as first-mover and the other as second-mover. We performed the random matching of
participants one week after the opening of the survey (including all who had responded
within the first week), and then at the end of the survey (including all participants
who filled the survey during the second week). In this way, we guaranteed that each
participant would receive her payoff within one week after survey completion. Subjects
also performed a belief-elicitation task, similar to the one regarding behavior in the DG
and with the same payoff rule, with respect to Player 1’s behavior in the Trust Game.8
Respondents also stated their best guesses about the average responses as Player 2 of
all other participants, for each possible amount received from Player 1. Their payoff was
then based on the accuracy of their guesses. A subject’s payoff is $12 minus the subject’s
average guessing error. To define the average guessing error, we take the absolute value
of the difference between the subject’s guess and the average amount transferred as
Player 2 by all other players, for each possible amount received from Player 1, and then
take an average across all possible amounts received from Player 1.
3.3 Experimental measures of social preferences
We use the four experiments to obtain two measures of self-interest, a measure of reci-
procity, and two measures of beliefs about others’ self-interest. Each measure is stan-
dardized such that it falls in the range [0, 1].
First, we measure how much behavior deviates from self interest (DFSI). For example,
in the Dictator Game if a player gives $10 and the self-interested choice would be 0, then
this amount would be divided by 10 (the maximum possible transfer) to give a measure
of 1; if a player gives 5, their DFSI measure would be 0.5, and so on. In the Trust Game,
if Player 2 returns to Player 1 everything she receives, their DFSI is 1; if they return
half the amount received, their DFSI is 0.5, and so on.
Second, we measure how much a subject believes the behavior of others will deviate
from self-interest (what we call guess DFSI ). This is the same as the above measure,
but based on the elicited beliefs.
Third, we measure reciprocity using behavior by Player 2 in the TG. Specifically, we
look at the covariation between the share of her endowment that Player 1 transfers to
Player 2 and the share of this transfer passed back by Player 2 to Player 1. If Player
2 increases the share she returns one-to-one with the share she receives, their measured
reciprocity is 1. A Player 2 who returns the same share, regardless of the transfer
received, has a reciprocity measure of 0. We provide further details about each measure
in Appendix B.
7Participants were matched across the entire sample, not within each treatment group.
8While we included this belief-elicitation question in the survey for symmetry, we will not use it in




We aggregate the information contained in the students’ evaluation of the 11 policy
statements into a smaller set of variables. We employ two alternative approaches to do
this.
The first approach uses a Principal Component Analysis (PCA) to extract the four
main principal components. We give them interpretative labels, based on the topics of
the statements to which they give larger (positive or negative) weights. We interpret
the first component as positioning a subject’s policy views on a left-right scale (‘Left-
right’). The second component appears to measure support for and positive view of free
markets (‘Pro-market’). The third and fourth are labeled, respectively, ‘Libertarian’ and
‘Communitarian’. See Table C.1 in Appendix C for details, including the weights that
each component gives to each statement.
The second approach takes simple averages of scores in statements which concern
the same topic. Specifically, we consider five indexes. They are calculated as simple
sums of scores in questions which share a common topic covering five areas: pro-market,
pro-government intervention, pro-green policies, trust in government, and immigration
restrictiveness. Each sum of individual scores is divided by its maximum possible value,
so that all indexes range from -1 to +1. Details on these indexes are provided in Appendix
C.
3.5 Estimation strategy
We estimate the effect of a semester-long intermediate microeconomics course on our
outcomes of interest using a difference-in-differences (DiD) strategy. We employ the
following fixed-effects regression:
yit = αi + γPostt + βEconi ∗ Postt + uit (3.1)
where i indexes individuals; t indexes the survey round (t = 0 for beginning-of-
semester and t = 1 for end-of-semester); y is an outcome of interest; αi captures indi-
vidual fixed-effects; Post is an indicator equal to 1 if t = 1 and 0 otherwise; Econ equals
1 if the respondent is enrolled in an intermediate microeconomics course, 0 otherwise.
The β coefficient provides the difference-in-differences estimate of the effect of the ‘in-
termediate microeconomics’ treatment. Standard errors are clustered at the individual
level.9
9Ideally, we would want to cluster standard errors at the treatment group level (economics vs. non-
economics students). This, however, is not possible, as it would result in only two clusters. Also clustering
at the course level would result in a too small number of clusters for reliable statistical inference (we
would have five clusters, four of which are treated). The standard Liang-Zeger clustering adjustment
tends to perform poorly (severely underestimating standard errors) with a small number of clusters
(Cameron and Miller 2015). This problem cannot be solved by using wild-bootstrap methods to adjust
for clustering: although they are robust to a small number of clusters, they cannot be applied in a
difference-in-differences setting in which treatment is assigned at the cluster level and there are few
treated clusters (MacKinnon and Webb 2018); in this setting, both restricted (WCR) and unrestricted
(WCU) versions of the wild-bootstrap method would provide severely biased estimates of standard errors
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To capture possible heterogeneity in effects based on the specific approach to eco-
nomics being taught, we also examine the effect of ‘Conventional’ and ‘Post Walrasian’
microeconomics courses separately, using the following specification:
yit = αi + γPostt + β
WConventionali ∗ Postt + βPWPostWalrasi ∗ Postt + uit (3.2)
where Conventional is a dummy equal to 1 if a student is enrolled in a conventional
intermediate microeconomics course; PostWalras is a dummy for being enrolled in what
we called the Post-Walrasian intermediate microeconomics course.10 βW is our estimate
of the effect of the ‘conventional microeconomics’ treatment, while βPW provides the
estimate of the effect of the ‘Post-Walrasian microeconomics’ treatment. The excluded
category is always the non-economics control group.
4 Results
4.1 Summary Statistics and consistency checks
Table 1 summarizes sample and sub-sample sizes and participation rates. 207 students
responded to both rounds of the survey.11 Participation rates are quite high, ranging
from 52% in the Conventional + SP course to 92.5% in the Post-Walrasian course. In
the overall sample, the participation rate is 70.2%%.
Table 2 reports the demographic distribution of participants and the share of eco-
nomics and business majors across courses. Almost all participants are between 19 and
25 years old. Among participants from the nutrition course, who constitute our control
group, there is no economics or business major, subjects are almost evenly distributed
between the 19-21 and 22-25 age categories, and the share of women is nearly 91%.
Among economics students in our sample, the share of economics or business majors is
94%, a large majority (84%) is in the 19-21 age category, and the share of women is
only 26%. This is broadly in line with national gender ratios. As long as the stark dif-
ferences in gender composition between treated and control groups are absorbed by the
individual fixed effects, they should not affect our estimates. They would, however, be
potentially problematic if male and female students displayed differential trends in social
preferences and policy opinions. We devote particular attention to assessing systematic
(MacKinnon and Webb 2018). The Ferman and Pinto (2019) and Conley and Taber (2011) approaches
are not applicable either, in our setting, as they require a large number of non-treated clusters. We
therefore cluster standard errors at the individual level. Inability to account for higher-level clustering
of error terms is a limitation of this study, which is imposed by the structure of our data.
10The courses that we called Conventional I and Conventional II are included in the ‘Conventional’
treatment; the post-Walrasian course represents the PostWalras treatment. We exclude from this ‘dis-
aggregated’ portion of the analysis the Conventional + SP course, because it is not clear in which of the
two groups it should be included. All the results we will present are robust to including the Conventional
+ SP course either in the Conventional or in the PostWalras treatment.
11We disregard observations for students who only participated in the first round or only in the second
round as we need observations from both survey rounds.
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gender differences in (changes in) behavior, and present robustness tests that estimate
our main regressions separately by gender.
Appendix Figures E.1 to E.5 plot frequency distributions for our measures of social
preferences before treatment, and for their changes over the course of the semester, by
gender. According to all measures, around 40% of respondents did not change their level
of altruism/reciprocity at all, 20% displayed only small changes, and 20% displayed large
changes. The distribution of the outcomes, and of their changes during the semester,
displays little systematic differences by gender.
The measures of generosity from the DG and from the TG are positively and signif-
icantly, although not strongly, correlated, with a Pearson correlation coefficient of 0.18
(p = 0.0003). Expectations about other people’s generosity from the two games are
also positively and significantly but not strongly correlated, with a Pearson correlation
coefficient of 0.12 (p = 0.015).
4.2 Effect on social preferences and beliefs
We start by simply looking at the distribution of changes in our outcomes of interest dur-
ing the semester, comparing economics and non-economics students. As shown in Figure
2, changes during the semester are distributed similarly in the two groups, suggesting
little effect of economics on social preferences and beliefs. This result is confirmed by
our difference-in-differences estimations, which we now describe.
Table 3 reports our baseline difference-in-differences estimates of the average effect
of intermediate microeconomics courses on students’ social preferences and beliefs about
social preferences. The top panel of Figure 3 visually summarizes the key results. To
interpret effect sizes, we report estimates of the effect of economics using the measures
of social preferences and beliefs as defined in Section 3.3 (which have an interpretation
in terms of percentage changes in generosity/reciprocity) and after standardizing each
measure to have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1 (so coefficients are interpreted
in terms of standard deviations).
Four main results stand out. First, average initial (pre-treatment) levels of altruism
are quite high in both groups, resulting in large deviations from the Nash equilibrium
predictions of self-interest. This is shown in the top panel of Table 3, which reports
pre-treatment averages for economics and nutrition students. On average, participants
donated well above half of their endowment in the Dictator Game with charities (59% for
economics students and 65% for non-economics students) and passed back more than a
third of their initial payoff when acting as Player 2 in the Trust Game (36% for economics
students and 39% for non-economics ones). Average levels of reciprocity are positive and
moderately strong. For a unit increase in the share passed on by Player 1, the share
passed back by Player 2 increases by approximately 0.29 among economics students and
0.22 in the control group.
Second, and consistent with most previous literature, economics students display
slightly lower levels of generosity in both games. However, they display higher levels of
reciprocity. This is shown in the second panel of Table 3, which reports a measure of se-
lection into economics: the difference in pre-treatment averages between economics and
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nutrition students. The blue bars in Figure 3a display this measure of selection bias, ex-
pressing it in terms of standard deviations. The difference in generosity is relatively small
(5.9% percentage points lower for economics students in the DG, and 2.6% percentage
points lower in the TG) and we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no difference at any
conventional significance level. Pre-treatment beliefs about other students’ generosity
do not appear to differ much between economics and the control group (slightly lower
for economics students in the DG, but slightly higher in the TG). Regarding reciprocity,
for each unit increase in the share of the endowment passed on by Player 1, economics
students increase the share they pass back as Player 2 by 0.08 additional units relative
to nutrition students (s.e. 0.05).
Third, social preferences and beliefs about social preferences remain stable for both
economics and non-economics students. The third panel of Table 3 and Figure 3a dis-
play changes during the semester. They show that both economics and non-economics
students tend to display stability of social preferences and of beliefs about others’ social
preferences. Changes in average levels of altruism and reciprocity and in beliefs during
the semester are small in both groups.
Fourth – and most important – economics education seems to have little effect on so-
cial preferences. The fourth panel of Table 3 reports the estimated effect of intermediate
microeconomics (obtained through the estimation of equation 3.1 in our sample). The
fifth panel reports the same estimated average effect after standardizing the outcome
variables, to help interpret effect sizes. Standardized effects are also reported in Figure
3a.
The estimated average treatment effect of intermediate microeconomics on social
preferences is close to zero. The estimated effect on generosity in the DG amounts to
+1.3 percentage points (with a standard error of 5.9 pp), or 0.04 standard deviations
(s.e. 0.17). The estimated effect on generosity in the TG is +0.3 percentage points (s.e.
2.2 pp), or 0.02 standard deviations (s.e. 0.14). The estimated effect on reciprocity is
-0.03 standard deviations (s.e. 0.15).
When using Player 2 behavior in the TG to measure generosity, the null effect is also
fairly precisely estimated. We can rule out at the 0.05 significance level a decrease in
generosity bigger than 4 percentage points or 0.25 standard deviations.
With respect to beliefs, Figure 3a shows that the estimated effect of economics on
beliefs about other people’s generosity in the DG is indistinguishable from zero. On gen-
erosity in the TG, however, the effect of economics on beliefs is -0.21 standard deviations
(s.e. 0.14). Though imprecisely estimated, the effect suggests that economics students
may modestly reduce their belief in others’ generosity in trusting interactions.
To assess whether these results are affected by the gender differences between the
treatment and control groups, in Appendix F.1 we estimate the effect of intermediate
microeconomics including only female students, obtaining similar results .12
To capture possible differences in treatment effects based on course content, we
12 The total number of female students in our sample is 84, and they are equally distributed between
the control and the treated group (42 in each). We are not able to estimate effects for males only, because
there are only 4 male students in the nutrition course that serves as a control group (Table 2).
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separate the impact of different course curricula. Results are summarized in the top
panel of Figure 4. More details are provided in Appendix Table G.1. We find little to
no difference. The estimated effect of both conventional and Post-Walrasian variants of
intermediate microeconomics is close to zero and we cannot reject the null hypothesis of
no effect at any conventional significance level, across all the experimental measures of
social preferences and beliefs.
4.3 Effects on policy preferences
Tables 4 and 5, and the bottom panels of Figure 3, report our results about the effects
of intermediate microeconomics courses on students’ policy preferences. In particular,
Table 4 and Figure 3b use the four principal components detected by our PCA; Table 5
and Figure 3c use simple averages of statements sharing a common topic. For symmetry
with the analysis of social preferences, we report estimated effects in terms of average
changes in the indexes and in terms of standard deviations. Specifically, the tables report
both raw and standardized effects, while figures display standardized coefficients. Below,
we focus on the standardized measures.
We first consider our measure of selection into economics: the difference in pre-
treatment average policy opinions between economics students and the control group.
On average, students enrolled in intermediate microeconomics are substantially and
significantly more ‘pro-market’. This is found both in the PCA analysis and in the
analysis using simple averages. The ‘pro-market’ component from the PCA is higher by
0.42 standard deviations for economics students (s.e. 0.18); the average agreement with
statements expressing a positive view of markets is higher by 0.47 standard deviations
(s.e. 0.17). After accounting for multiple hypothesis testing through the Westfall and
Young (1993) method, the adjusted p-value for the selection effect in the ‘pro-market’
variable is 0.106 for the PCA component and 0.030 for the simple average.13 Economics
students also display a higher pre-treatment average for the ‘Left-right’ component, by
0.20 standard deviations. This means that they are, on average, politically to the right
of the control group students. This difference is, however, imprecisely estimated (s.e.
0.15) and we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no selection effect for this variable.
Selection effects are rather small and indistinguishable from zero for all other measures
of policy preferences.
We then turn to our difference-in-differences estimates of the effect of intermediate
microeconomics. We find no effect on any of the four principal components that summa-
rize students’ policy positions, nor on their average opinions on free markets, government
intervention, and green policies. We do, however, find effects on their opinions on im-
migration policy: economics seems to make students favor more restrictive immigration.
Specifically, their support for the statement ‘Immigrants from other countries should
be prohibited except where it can be shown that they will contribute to the quality of
13 This result is robust to using alternative methods to adjust for multiple hypothesis testing. Specif-
ically, the adjusted p-values are respectively 0.073 and 0.027 if using the Bonferroni-Holm method, and
0.071 and 0.027 when using the Sidak-Holm method. We use the ‘wyoung’ command in STATA (Jones,
Molitor, and Reif 2018) in order to perform adjustment for multiple hypothesis testing.
12
life of the current resident population ’ (Statement Q9, the only component question of
the ‘immigration restriction’ index) increases by 0.34 standard deviations (s.e. 0.135)
among economics students relative to the control group. After accounting for multiple
hypothesis testing through the Westfall and Young (1993) method, the adjusted p-value
for this effect is 0.056.14
To put the effect we have found on students’ opinions on immigration policy in
context, note that at the beginning of the semester economics students (as well as the
control group) on average disagree with the restrictive view of immigration (first panel
of Table 5). The average pre-treatment value for the ‘immigration restrictiveness in-
dex’ is equal to -0.36 for both economics and non-economics students (on a scale that
ranges from -1 to 1). The index increases on average by 0.096 (s.e. 0.046) during the
semester for economics students, while in the control group it decreases by a similar mag-
nitude. Notwithstanding this significant increase, at the end of the semester economics
students remain on average substantially more likely to disagree than to agree with the
restrictionist view of immigration.
There is also some sign of a possible modest negative effect of economics on trust
in government, but it is rather small and quite imprecisely estimated. Trust in the
government of the State of Massachusetts decreases by 0.16 standard deviations among
economics students relative to the control group (s.e. 0.17). However, a 95% confidence
interval for this effect cannot reject the null hypothesis of zero effect, and, after account-
ing for multiple hypothesis testing through the Westfall and Young (1993) method, the
p-value for this effect is 0.78.
While the aggregations we have performed allow us to convey results in a more
compact and informative way, in Appendix Figure G.4 we also look at effects on each
single policy statement, reaching similar conclusions: there is no substantial impact on
any single policy statement, except for the effect on immigration policy.
Results are similar when including only female students, so they do not appear to
be driven by gender differences between the treated and the control groups (Appendix
F.1).
The estimated effects on policy preferences also appear to display little difference
based on course content. The bottom panel of Figure 4 reports separately the ef-
fect of different microeconomics courses. Most importantly, the positive effect on the
‘immigration-restrictive’ variable is visible in both the ‘conventional’ courses and the
‘post-Walrasian’ one. There is no discernible effect on any other policy opinion in any
of the two types of courses. The only significant difference in results is in selection ef-
fects: the higher pre-treatment values for the pro-market variable and the ‘Left-right’
components among economics students seem to be mostly driven by the courses with a
conventional curriculum.
In Appendix H we also test whether the microeconomics courses have any moder-
ating (or polarizing) effect on students’ policy opinions, following the methodology of
Makowsky and Miller (2014). To this end, we calculate their index of ‘attitude extrem-
14 Using the Bonferroni-Holm method produces an adjusted p-value of 0.064; the Sidak-Holm method
gives an adjusted p-value of 0.062.
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ity’ in our sample. This is defined as the average squared deviation from the neutral
mid-point of the Likert scale, expressed as a percentage of the maximum possible devi-
ation (Makowsky and Miller 2014, p. 838). We find little differential change in ‘attitude
extremity’ among economics students: intermediate microeconomics does not seem to
have any substantial moderating (or polarizing) effect in our sample.
5 Conclusion
This paper revisits the question ‘does economics make you selfish?’ In particular, we
estimate the impact of semester-long intermediate microeconomics courses on social
preferences, policy opinions, and beliefs about other people’s social preferences.
The economics students in our sample start the semester with a more favorable
opinion of market competition and relatively more conservative policy views, and display
lower generosity and higher reciprocity in experimental games. But other than economics
students being substantially more “pro market”, these effects of differential selection into
economics are relatively small and imprecisely estimated.
We found little to no causal effect of studying economics on social preferences and
beliefs about other people’s social preferences. Differences in these outcomes between
economics students and the control group did not change during the semester, and are
also unaffected by the content of the economics course. We find no effect on an aggregate
“left-right” measure of political positions, nor on views of markets, government inter-
vention, and green policies. The sole evidence of a substantial effect is that economics
students come to express less opposition to a highly restrictive statement about immi-
gration policy. This effect is economically relevant, but only marginally significant when
accounting for multiple-hypothesis testing. Further research will be needed to assess the
robustness of this result, and, should it prove robust, evaluate the mechanisms.
Overall, our results are thus consistent with the two other difference-in-differences
studies of the effects of a substantial exposure to economics teaching (Frey and Meier
2003; Bauman and Rose 2011). We do not conclude, on the basis of our study of a single
semester in intermediate microeconomics, that economics does not make you selfish. It
could be that the main effect of studying economics occurs at the introductory level,
or that a single semester is too brief an exposure to produce a detectable effect. The
Bauman and Rose (2011) study, however, suggests caution in accepting this explanation
of our results. They found that the negative effect of studying economics among non-
majors was larger for the intermediate than for the introductory courses, and estimated
that an additional single semester of economics (at whatever level) reduced contributions
by a substantial amount.
The differences between our study and those based on a brief experimentally induced
exposure to economics (Ifcher and Zarghamee 2018; Molinsky, Grant, and Margolis 2012)
arise because we are measuring different things. The experimentally induced exposure
to economics leveraged by these studies provides a frame or a prime, suggesting the
type of problem that is being addressed or activating particular mental modules. The
framing or priming then constitutes a particular state in which the decision-maker acts.
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The results of these experiments show that social preferences are state-dependent (a
psychologist would say, situation-dependent).
While the duration of these state-dependent effects has not adequately been studied,
an implication of this interpretation is that the effects of brief experimentally induced ex-
posure to economics should be temporary. An example of such transient state-dependent
effects is a standard repeated public goods experiment in which moral or neutral mes-
sages are delivered to subjects: the immediate and substantial positive effect of the moral
messages entirely vanished after 10 rounds of play (Dal Bó and Dal Bó 2014).
The more extended and natural-setting exposure to economics in our study could
have both state-dependent effects and longer term learning effects, by which preferences
change in a durable (not state-dependent) manner. A conclusion consistent with the
evidence from previous studies (along with our own) would be that exposure to economics
has state-dependent effects on preferences, but does not produce the durable changes in
preferences associated with the term endogenous preferences.
We outlined at the outset a line of reasoning that might lead us to affirm the com-
monplace view that studying economics leads to more self-interested behavior. But there
are also cogent reasons to expect the opposite. Montesquieu, Voltaire, Smith and other
18th century thinkers held that markets promote honesty and cooperativeness towards
others, and that these predispositions are as important as self-interest in making markets
work.15 Students in today’s economics courses might well marvel that in markets, even
when interacting with total strangers, adherence to social norms of respect for others’
property rights and reciprocating goodwill (eg, not stealing the other’s goods) can be the
basis for mutually beneficial exchange. Exposure to this message could promote social
preferences as well as self-interest.16
One possible explanation for our results is that the potential mechanisms we outlined
at the outset, through which studying economics would promote self-interest, are just not
active, or not powerful enough to produce a discernible effect. It is also possible, however,
that these mechanisms are present, but are offset by ”doux commerce” mechanisms, as
the ones we just described, working in the opposite direction.
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Knowles, Stephen and Maroš Servátka (2015). “Transaction costs, the opportunity cost
of time and procrastination in charitable giving”. Journal of public economics 125,
pp. 54–63.
Konow, James (2019). “Can ethics instruction make economics students more pro-
social?” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 166, pp. 724 –734.
MacKinnon, J. G. and M. D. Webb (2018). “The wild bootstrap for few (treated) clus-
ters”. The Econometrics Journal 21.2, pp. 114–135.
Makowsky, Michael D and Stephen C Miller (2014). “Education, intelligence, and atti-
tude extremity”. Public Opinion Quarterly 78.4, pp. 832–858.
Marwell, Gerald and Ruth E Ames (1981). “Economists free ride, does anyone else?:
Experiments on the provision of public goods, IV”. Journal of public economics 15.3,
pp. 295–310.
Mazar, Nina, On Amir, and Dan Ariely (2008). “The dishonesty of honest people: A
theory of self-concept maintenance”. Journal of marketing research 45.6, pp. 633–
644.
Molinsky, Andrew L, Adam M Grant, and Joshua D Margolis (2012). “The bedside
manner of homo economicus: How and why priming an economic schema reduces
compassion”. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 119.1, pp. 27–
37.
Murphy, Sheila T, Jennifer L Monahan, and Robert B Zajonc (1995). “Additivity of non-
conscious affect: combined effects of priming and exposure.” Journal of personality
and social psychology 69.4, p. 589.
Murphy, Sheila T and Robert B Zajonc (1993). “Affect, cognition, and awareness: affec-
tive priming with optimal and suboptimal stimulus exposures.” Journal of personality
and social psychology 64.5, p. 723.
17
O’Roark, J. B. and W. C. Wood (2011). “Determinants of congressional minimum wage
support: the role of economic education”. Public Choice 147.1, pp. 209–225.
Perloff, Jeffrey M (2011). “Microeconomics (The Pearson Series in Economics)”.
Pindyck, Robert S and Daniel L Rubinfeld (2012). Microeconomics: International Edi-
tion.
Rubinstein, Ariel (2006). “A Sceptic’s Comment on the Study of Economics”. The Eco-
nomic Journal 116.510.
Shalvi, Shaul, Francesca Gino, Rachel Barkan, and Shahar Ayal (2015). “Self-serving
justifications: Doing wrong and feeling moral”. Current Directions in Psychological
Science 24.2, pp. 125–130.
Stafford, Tom (2013). Does Economics make you more selfish? British Broadcasting
Corporation, BCC Future. http://www.bbc.com/future/story/20131022-are-
economists-more-selfish.
Stigler, G. (1959). “The politics of political economists”. The Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics 73.4, pp. 522–532.
Varian, Hal R (2014). Intermediate microeconomics with calculus: a modern approach.
WW Norton & Company.
Vedantam, Shankar (2017). Does Studying Economics Make You Selfish? National Public
Radio, Morning Edition. 21 Feb 2017. https : / / www . npr . org / 2017 / 02 / 21 /
516375434/does-studying-economics-make-you-selfish.
Wang, Long, Deepak Malhotra, and J Keith Murnighan (2011). “Economics education
and greed”. Academy of Management Learning & Education 10.4, pp. 643–660.
Westfall, P H and S S Young (1993). Resampling-based multiple testing: Examples and
methods for p-value adjustment. Vol. 279. John Wiley & Sons.
Xiao, Erte and Daniel Houser (2018). “Sign me up! A model and field experiment on vol-
unteering”. SSRN Working Paper No. 2378038; Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2378038.
Yezer, Anthony M, Robert S Goldfarb, and Paul J Poppen (1996). “Does studying
economics discourage cooperation? Watch what we do, not what we say or how we
play”. The Journal of Economic Perspectives 10.1, pp. 177–186.
Zajonc, Robert B (1965). “Social facilitation”. Science 149.3681, pp. 269–274.
18
Figures
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Topic 0: market structure and competition
44 Competition and market structure
49 Advertising and consumer demand
51 Measurement; market structure
54 Exit, entry and firm strategy
80 Elasticity of demand and supply




47 Decision theory and expected utility
71 Utility functions; theory
74 Labor supply
93 Intertemporal optimization
Topic 2: Strategic interaction and incomplete 
information
0 Monitoring and enforcement
4 Adverse selection; "lemons"
10 Bargaining and incomplete information
20 Game theory and behavioral economics
52 Incomplete contracts and principal-agent models
69 Theory of games
73 Adverse selection, moral hazard; insurance
94 Strategic interactions, asymmetric information; 
theory
Figure 1: The location of microeconomics textbooks in a 3 meta-topics space.
Notes: Coordinates of the textbooks are the topic weights for the meta-topics at the vertices. For
example, Varian has a location of (0.53, 0.28, 0.19), that is, a weight of 0.58 on market structure
(meta-topic 0), a weight of 0.28 on individual optimization and expected utility (meta-topic 1), and a
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(e) Reciprocity in Trust Game
Figure 2: Experimental measures of social preferences - distribution of changes during
the semester
Notes: Smoothed density plots for the distribution of changes during the semester. Distribution of
changes for economics students in light blue; distribution of changes for the control group (nutrition
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(c) Policy views: simple averages
Figure 3: Effect of Intermediate Microeconomics on students’ social preferences, beliefs
and policy preferences
Notes: The Figures display visually our difference-in-differences estimates of the effect of an
Intermediate Microeconomics course on students’ social preferences, beliefs about other students’ social
preferences, and policy preferences. See Section 3.3 and Appendices B and C for the definition of each
outcome variable. All outcome variables are standardized. For each outcome of interest, the graphs
display: differences between averages for Intermediate Microeconomics and non-economics students in
the first (pre-treatment) survey round (‘Selection into Econ’); the average change during the semester
among Intermediate Microeconomics students (‘Change [Econ]’) and non-economics students (‘change
[Non econ]’); and our difference-in-differences estimate of the effect of Intermediate Microeconomics
(‘Effect of Econ’, given by the difference between the two changes). Dots represent point estimates, bars
are 95% confidence intervals from standard errors clustered at the individual level.
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(d) Post Walrasian curriculum
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(f) Post Walrasian curriculum
Figure 4: Effect of Intermediate Microeconomics – Conventional vs. Post Walrasian curriculum
Notes: The Figures displays our difference-in-differences estimates of the effect of an Intermediate Microeconomics course on students’
social preferences, beliefs about other students’ social preferences, and policy preferences. See Section 3.3 and Appendices B and C for the
definition of each outcome variable. For each curriculum and for each outcome of interest, the graphs displays differences between averages
for Intermediate Microeconomics and non-economics students in the first (pre-treatment) survey round (‘Selection into Econ’) and the effect
of Intermediate Microeconomics (‘Effect of Econ’). Dots represent point estimates, bars are 95% confidence intervals from standard errors
clustered at the individual level.
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Tables
Table 1: Number of respondents who participated in both rounds of the survey, by course
Course Frequency Total Enrolled Participation rate
Post Walrasian 37 40 92.5%
Conventional I 62 98 63.3%
Conventional + SP 13 25 52.0%
Conventional II 49 70 70.0%
Nutrition and metabolism 46 62 74.2%
Total 207 295 70.2%
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Table 2: Distribution of respondents by gender, region of origin, major and age
Major Age
Female Asia Europe Other US Economics Business 16-18 19-21 22-25 > 26
Course
Post Walrasian 0.22 0.07 0.03 0.00 0.91 0.84 0.08 0.07 0.81 0.12 0.00
Conventional I 0.26 0.15 0.00 0.02 0.83 0.77 0.17 0.05 0.88 0.07 0.00
Conventional + SP 0.08 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.81 0.69 0.31 0.00 0.50 0.27 0.23
Conventional II 0.35 0.10 0.00 0.02 0.88 0.86 0.10 0.05 0.91 0.04 0.00
Nutrition 0.91 0.08 0.00 0.04 0.88 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.42 0.53 0.04
Econ vs Non Econ
Non Econ 0.91 0.08 0.00 0.04 0.88 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.42 0.53 0.04
Econ 0.26 0.12 0.01 0.01 0.86 0.80 0.14 0.05 0.84 0.09 0.02
Total 0.41 0.11 0.00 0.02 0.86 0.63 0.11 0.04 0.75 0.19 0.02
Notes: For each gender, region of origin, major and age range indicated in column, this Table reports the share of respondents, by course and by
treatment group. Here ‘region of origin’ is defined as the region where a student attended high school.
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Table 3: Difference-in-differences (DiD) estimates of the effect of Intermediate Microeconomics on students’ social preferences
and beliefs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Generosity in Generosity in Beliefs about Beliefs about Reciprocity in
Dictator Game Trust Game generosity (DG) generosity (TG) Trust Game
[dfsi dg] [dfsi tg p2] [guess dfsi dg] [guess dfsi tg p2] [recip]
Mean Before (Econ) 0.591 0.359 0.467 0.321 0.294
(0.027) (0.012) (0.017) (0.012) (0.023)
Mean Before (Non Econ) 0.650 0.385 0.500 0.307 0.215
(0.051) (0.023) (0.033) (0.022) (0.044)
Selection (into Econ) -0.059 -0.026 -0.033 0.014 0.079
(0.058) (0.026) (0.037) (0.025) (0.05)
Change (Econ) -0.041 -0.030 0.004 -0.027 -0.034
(0.029) (0.015) (0.02) (0.013) (0.022)
Change (Non Econ) -0.054 -0.033 0.009 0.004 -0.025
(0.051) (0.016) (0.035) (0.016) (0.037)
DiD (Effect of Econ) 0.013 0.003 -0.005 -0.031 -0.010
(0.059) (0.022) (0.041) (0.021) (0.043)
Standardized
DiD (Effect of Econ) 0.038 0.017 -0.023 -0.210 -0.032
(0.169) (0.138) (0.185) (0.143) (0.145)
N 414 414 414 414 414
Notes: This table reports difference-in-differences (DiD) estimates for the effect of a semester-long intermediate microeconomics course on
students’ social preferences and beliefs about other students’ social preferences. See Section 3.3 for the definition of each outcome variable. All
outcome variables range from 0 (perfect self-interest) to 1 (maximum possible deviation from self-interest). The ‘Mean before’ panel reports the
average of the outcome variables in the first (pre-treatment) survey round for Economics and non-Economics students; ‘Selection’ is the difference
in ‘Mean before’ between Economics and non-Economics students; ‘Change’ is the average change in the outcome variable between the first
(pre-treatment) and the second (post-treatment) survey round. ‘DiD (Effect of Econ)’ reports our estimates of the effect of intermediate
microeconomics, using the DiD specification in equation 3.1; ‘Standardized DiD (Effect of Econ)’ reports the same estimated average effect after
standardizing the outcome variables. Standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses.
25
Table 4: Difference-in-differences estimates of the effect of Intermediate Microeconomics on students’ policy views (principal
components)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Left-Right Pro market Libertarian Communitarian
Mean Before (Econ) 0.086 0.148 -0.045 -0.082
(0.127) (0.105) (0.085) (0.077)
Mean Before (Non Econ) -0.240 -0.418 -0.113 0.015
(0.221) (0.213) (0.158) (0.153)
Selection (into Econ) 0.326 0.566 0.068 -0.097
(0.255) (0.238) (0.18) (0.172)
Change (Econ) -0.012 -0.070 0.153 0.111
(0.087) (0.105) (0.08) (0.093)
Change (Non Econ) -0.083 0.047 0.010 0.157
(0.177) (0.209) (0.126) (0.172)
DiD (Effect of Econ) 0.071 -0.117 0.142 -0.047
(0.197) (0.234) (0.149) (0.196)
Standardized
DiD (Effect of Econ) 0.043 -0.087 0.134 -0.046
(0.119) (0.174) (0.14) (0.19)
N 414 414 414 414
Notes: This table reports difference-in-differences estimates for the effect of a semester-long intermediate microeconomics course on students’
policy views. We use Principal Component Analysis to extract the four main components from the 11 policy statements that we ask participants
to score. The ‘Mean before’ panel reports the average of the outcome variables in the first (pre-treatment) survey round for Economics and
non-Economics students; ‘Selection’ is the difference in ‘Mean before’ between Economics and non-Economics students; ‘Change’ is the average
change in the outcome variable between the first (pre-treatment) and the second (post-treatment) survey round. ‘DiD (Effect of Econ)’ reports our
estimates of the effect of intermediate microeconomics, using the DiD specification in equation 3.1; ‘Standardized DiD (Effect of Econ)’ reports
the same estimated average effect after standardizing the outcome variables. Standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses.
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Table 5: Difference-in-differences (DiD) estimates of the effect of Intermediate Microeconomics on students’ policy preferences
(simple averages)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Pro-Market Pro-Gov’t inter-
vention
Pro-Green Trust in gov’t Immigration
restrictive
Mean Before (Econ) 0.151 0.291 0.523 0.264 -0.357
(0.026) (0.029) (0.031) (0.037) (0.047)
Mean Before (Non Econ) 0.003 0.337 0.565 0.293 -0.359
(0.045) (0.05) (0.064) (0.07) (0.095)
Selection (into Econ) 0.148 -0.046 -0.042 -0.030 0.002
(0.053) (0.058) (0.072) (0.079) (0.106)
Change (Econ) -0.018 0.027 0.005 -0.087 0.096
(0.023) (0.022) (0.028) (0.033) (.046)
Change (Non Econ) 0.011 0.000 -0.027 -0.011 -0.109
(0.05) (0.045) (0.044) (0.072) (0.067)
DiD (Effect of Econ) -0.029 0.027 0.032 -0.076 0.205
(0.055) (0.05) (0.052) (0.079) (0.082)
Standardized
DiD (Effect of Econ) -0.091 0.075 0.076 -0.161 0.339
(0.174) (0.137) (0.124) (0.166) (0.135)
N 414 414 414 414 414
Notes: This table reports difference-in-differences estimates for the effect of a semester-long intermediate microeconomics course on students’
policy preferences. Outcome variables are simple averages of scores for policy statements concerning the same topic. See Section C for the precise
definition of each outcome variable. All outcome variables range from -2 to 2. The ‘Mean before’ panel reports the average of the outcome
variables in the first (pre-treatment) survey round for Economics and non-Economics students; ‘Selection’ is the difference in ‘Mean before’
between Economics and non-Economics students; ‘Change’ is the average change in the outcome variable between the first (pre-treatment) and
the second (post-treatment) survey round. ‘DiD (Effect of Econ)’ reports our estimates of the effect of intermediate microeconomics, using the
DiD specification in equation 3.1; ‘Standardized DiD (Effect of Econ)’ reports the same estimated average effect after standardizing the outcome
variables. Standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses.
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Online Appendix
A Experimental Design, Survey Details and Questionnaire
A.1 Timeline
We administered the same online survey, at the beginning and towards the end of the
semester.
• We administered the first round between January 14 and January 28, 2019.17
• The second round was conducted between April 8 and April 24, 2019.
The complete surveys (in PDF) are included as online appendices.
The steps of the experimental design are explained in the section ”Experimental
Design” of the main paper. Nonetheless, we reiterate them here for clarity. The survey
includes the following:
• standard demographic and academic information,
• questions eliciting students’ policy opinions,
• incentivized choice experiments (economic games), and
• incentivized belief-elicitation questions regarding a subject’s beliefs about the be-
havior of others in the same games.
The wording of all the policy questions is available in Appendix A.4, with topics covering
immigration, the functioning of markets, government regulation, and climate change.
The survey asked participants to play four incentivized games:
• a Triple Dictator Game (DG),
• a Trust Game (TG), and
• two belief-elicitation tasks about the behavior of other participants in these games.
The order in which the two games were presented was randomized: each participant
was equally likely to play the DG first or the TG first. After completion of the survey,
we randomly selected one of the four games for payment.
17We allowed students that enrolled in the course after January 28 to take the survey between January
29 and February 4. 9 students from the Nutrition and Metabolism course participated in the survey
between January 28 and February 4. Results are unchanged if we exclude these ‘late participants’.
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A.1.1 Triple Dictator Game and belief elicitation
In the Triple Dictator Game (DG) with charities the respondent is allocated $10 and
given the possibility to donate a portion to a local non-profit charitable organization
from a list of three. The list included non-partisan, non-controversial, and apolitical
organizations. Any amount donated would be tripled, consistent with Ashraf, Bohnet,
and Piankov (2006).
We then ask the subject to guess the average contribution of the other participants.
The subject’s payoff depended on how close they were to the actual average: their
payoff was $12 minus the absolute value of the guessing error. The guessing error is
defined as the difference between a subject’s guess and the average donation of all other
respondents.
A.1.2 Trust Game and belief elicitation
In the Trust Game (TG), participants are anonymously and randomly paired (Berg,
Dickhaut, and McCabe 1995). Within each pair, one player is randomly assigned the
role of first mover, while the other is the second mover. The first mover is allocated $10.
She must transfer a share of this $10 of her choice to the second mover (the amount sent
may be zero if the first mover chooses so). The first mover is also informed that whatever
she sends will be tripled by the experimenter. Once the first mover chooses a value, the
experimenter will triple it and transfer it to the second mover. The second mover is then
told to make a similar choice: transfer some share of the now-tripled money back to the
first mover (the amount given back may be zero, should the second mover choose so).
Subjects played the games asynchronously with matching occurring later. Each
subject specified how they would play both roles (first mover and second mover) and
we used the strategy method for the case of the choices as the second mover. Each
participant was therefore asked to specify:
1. how much they would send as first mover;
2. how much they would send back as second mover for each possible transfer of the
first mover in whole numbers.
A.1.3 Matching Rules and Payments
To determine payments, each participant was then (after completion of the surveys)
randomly paired with another participant. In each pair, one was randomly selected
as first mover and the other as second mover. We performed the random matching of
participants one week after the opening of the survey (including all who had responded
within the first week), and then at the end of the survey (including all participants
who filled the survey during the second week). In this way, we guaranteed that each
participant would receive her payoff within one week after survey completion. Subjects
also performed a belief-elicitation task, similar to the one regarding behavior in the DG
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and with the same payoff rule, with respect to Player 1’s behavior in the Trust Game.18
Respondents also stated their best guesses about the average responses as Player 2 of
all other participants, for each possible amount received from Player 1. Their payoff was
then based on the accuracy of their guesses. A subject’s payoff is $12 minus the subject’s
average guessing error. To define the average guessing error, we take the absolute value
of the difference between the subject’s guess and the average amount transferred as
Player 2 by all other players, for each possible amount received from Player 1, and then
take an average across all possible amounts received from Player 1.
A.2 Sample
Our sample comprises students from the following five courses:
• a course with conventional content, offered by the Department of Economics and
using the Pindyck and Rubinfeld (2012) textbook (Conventional I);
• a course with conventional content, offered by the Department of Resource Eco-
nomics and using the Perloff (2011) textbook (Conventional II);19
• a course with an innovative ‘behavioral’ curriculum, stressing externalities, incom-
plete contracts and social preferences, offered by the Economics Department and
using the Bowles and Halliday (2020) textbook (Post Walrasian);
• an online course with a largely standard curriculum, apart from one section on
the presence of social preferences, offered by the Economics department and using
the Frank, Gilovich, and Regan (1993) textbook (Conventional plus Social Prefer-
ences);
• a course on Nutrition and Metabolism offered by the Food Science department,
which we use as a control group.
The economics course which we call for brevity ‘Post Walrasian’ was taught by one of
the authors. It incorporates research from behavioral economics into every aspect of the
course, and does not present ‘homo economicus’ as the norm for behavior. Importantly,
the ‘Post-Walrasian’ approach of the course was not signaled beforehand to students in
any way: the brief course description that students could see in the course enrollment
platform used by the University was identical to that of the conventional course offered by
the same Department (Conventional I) and suggested no difference between the courses’
content.
As shown in Table 1 in the main text, a total of 295 students were enrolled in these
courses. 202 of them completed both rounds of our survey.
18While we included this belief-elicitation question in the survey for symmetry, we will not use it in
estimation, because the behavior of Player 1 in the TG does not have a clear interpretation in terms of
deviation from self-interest.




To be eligible to participate in the experiment, a subject had to be registered for one of




• Conventional + SP
• Nutrition
Each subject received a recruitment email at each stage of the experiment (start of the
semester and end of the semester). The text of the email is included in the experimental
instructions appendix. The email contained a link to the survey and experimental tasks
using Qualtrics. Only subjects who completed the surveys at both stages were included
in the sample.
Students in the sample received an invitation email signed ‘Research Group on Hu-
man Behavior – UMass Amherst’. The invitation email and two subsequent reminders
were forwarded to students by the course Professor and/or by a Teaching Assistant (TA).
To encourage participation, students who filled the survey in both rounds received
extra-credits in the course in question, amounting to 1.25% of the final grade in the
Walrasian I course, 2% in the Walrasian II course, 3% in the Post-Walrasian course,
2% in the Walrasian + SP course and 2% in the Nutrition and Metabolism course.
A.3.1 Demographic and academic information
We collected information on the age and gender of the respondent, their region of origin,
the year of study (freshman, sophomore, junior, senior) and their major. We also asked
if they had ever taken an economics course before this semester and if so how many. We
asked them to list all the courses they were taking this semester. We also asked for the
highest level of education completed by both parents as a proxy for the socio-economic
status of the family.
A.4 List of policy statements
We asked the respondents to rank the following statements on a five-point Likert scale
(from ‘Strongly Disagree’ to ‘Strongly Agree’).
Q1: The US government should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone’s basic
needs are satisfied.
Q2: In most situations, government intervention cannot make the market system work
better.
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Q3: I tend to trust the government of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.
Q4: I tend to trust the functioning of the free market.
Q5: The Government should impose a carbon tax, defined as a tax on the CO2 emissions
that a firm produces.
Q6: The minimum wage in the US should be raised from the current 7.25 dollars per
hour to 14 dollars or more (which would mean around $27000 a year for a full time
worker before deducting taxes).
Q7: Market competition is mostly good. It weeds out those (people, companies, etc.)
who are not doing a good job, while rewarding good ideas.
Q8: Market competition can be harmful. It brings out the worst in people and creates
a society of winners and losers.
Q9: Immigrants from other countries should be prohibited except where it can be shown
that they will contribute to the quality of life of the current resident population.
Q10: We owe it to people in the future to pass on to them a planet with environmental
conditions no worse than they are today even if this means tightening our belts
now.
Q11: Even if pornography is offensive to some, the government should not prohibit its
sale to adults.
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B Measures of Self-interest and Reciprocity
Generosity in the DG [dfsi dg] For the Dictator Game, an entirely self-interested
actor would donate nothing and keep everything for herself. The deviation from self
interest in the Dictator Game (dfsi dg) would therefore be the total amount donated
minus the total amount that a purely self-interested actor would donate (zero). We divide
this by the total amount that could be donated so that the deviation from self interest
ranges from zero (entirely self interested) to one (entirely altruistic). This measure
captures deviations from self-interest due to generosity.
Generosity in Dictator Game [dfsi dg ] =
Donation in the DG − 0
Max possible donation
(B.1)
Beliefs about generosity in the DG [guess dfsi dg] We use Equation B.2 to
extract a measure of beliefs about other people’s deviation from self-interest (due to
generosity), using the ‘guessing game’ about donations in the DG. An individual that
expects all others to be self-interested, would expect the average donation to be zero.
We divide the guess by the maximum donation possible, such that the deviation from
self-interest expectation ranges from zero (for a subject who expects all others to donate
nothing) to one (for a subject who expects all others to donate their entire endowment).
Belief about generosity in DG [guess dfsi dg] =
Guess about average donation in the DG − 0
Maximum possible donation
(B.2)
Generosity in the TG [dfsi tg p2 ] As we used the strategy method for Player 2’s
choices in the trust game, we define dfsi tg p2 as the average amount returned as Player
2 divided by the maximum average possible (defined as the average for a hypothetical
Player 2 who always returns everything she receives). A self-interested actor would
always return 0. dfsi tg p2 therefore ranges from zero (entirely self interested) to one
(entirely altruistic).
Generosity in Trust Game [dfsi tg p2 ] =
Average amount returned as Player 2 − 0
Max possible average
(B.3)
Beliefs about generosity in the TG [guess dfsi tg p2] For the guessing game
about actions of Player 2 in the TG, an individual who expects all others to be ‘homo
economicus’ would expect everyone to keep the entire sum at their disposal, indepen-
dently of the amount received, implying an average amount returned of zero. We divide
the guess by the maximum possible average, such that guess dfsi tg p2 ranges from zero
(for a subject who expects all others to always return zero) to one (for a subject who
expects all others to always return the whole available amount).
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Belief about generosity in TG [guess dfsi tg p2 ] =
Guess about average amount returned as Player 2 − 0
Maximum average possible
(B.4)
Reciprocity in the TG [recip] We also estimate a measure of deviation from self-
interest due to reciprocity. This is based on Player 2 behavior in the Trust Game.
Specifically, we define reciprocity (recip) as the average effect of increases in the share of
her initial endowment that P1 transfers to P2 on the share of this transfer passed back
by P2 to P1. For instance, if Player 2 does not vary the share passed back as the share
she receives increases, her reciprocity is 0; if instead the share passed back increases one-
by-one with the share received, reciprocity takes a value of 1. We estimate this average
effect by running the following regression separately for each individual observation in
our sample
P2 transfer to P1
amount available to P2
= α+ φ




Reciprocity in TG [recip] = φ (B.5)
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C Aggregate measures of policy preferences
To measure policy preferences on each single policy question, we scored the responses
such that ”Strongly Disagree” would take a value of -2; ”Disagree” would take a value
of -1, ”Neither agree nor disagree” would take a value of 0; ”Agree” would take a value
of 1 and ”Strongly Agree” would take a value of 2.
We then aggregate the information into a smaller number of variables, using two
alternative approaches. First, we perform a standard Principal Component Analysis
(PCA) on the scores given by students to these statements. We extract the first four
components (which together explain 60.8% of variation in the data) and use them in
estimation. Table C reports the loading matrix for all components and the proportion
of variance explained by each.
The second approach consists in taking simple average scores of statements concern-
ing the same topic. Specifically, we consider the following five indexes:
• ‘Pro-market’= (+Q2 +Q4 +Q7 −Q8)/8
• ‘Pro-government intervention’ = (+Q1 +Q5 +Q6 −Q2)/8
• ‘Pro-green policies’ = (+Q5 +Q10)/4
• ‘Trust in government’ = +Q3/2
• ‘Immigration-restrictive ’ = +Q9/2
where Qi represents the score (defined as above) from the response to question i
(questions are listed in Appendix A, Section A.4).
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Table C.1: Principal component analysis - Loading matrix
Comp 1 Comp 2 Comp 3 Comp 4 Comp 5 Comp 6 Comp 7 Comp 8 Comp 9 Comp 10 Comp 11
Q1 (Govt. ensure basic needs met) 0.421 0.123 -0.126 0.029 0.256 -0.182 0.108 0.564 -0.592 0.110 -0.020
Q2 (Govt. can’t improve markets) -0.182 0.318 -0.112 0.610 -0.401 0.171 -0.385 0.073 -0.182 0.260 -0.191
Q3 (Trust in the state Govt.) 0.278 0.373 -0.248 -0.081 -0.020 0.497 0.513 -0.319 0.012 0.320 0.002
Q4 (Trust in the market) -0.184 0.562 -0.107 0.009 -0.117 0.051 0.157 0.297 0.127 -0.625 0.320
Q5 (Pro carbon tax) 0.426 0.149 -0.089 -0.099 0.263 0.272 -0.454 -0.021 0.228 -0.343 -0.509
Q6 (Pro $15 min wage) 0.402 -0.001 -0.294 0.250 -0.046 -0.349 -0.054 0.162 0.628 0.250 0.282
Q7 (Market competition good) -0.094 0.526 0.168 -0.033 0.140 -0.642 0.123 -0.307 0.023 0.095 -0.367
Q8 (Market competition harmful) 0.218 -0.250 0.192 0.686 0.082 -0.017 0.415 -0.181 -0.027 -0.387 -0.139
Q9 (Severely restrict immigration) -0.302 0.145 0.156 0.266 0.784 0.216 -0.108 0.049 0.125 0.210 0.238
Q10 (Sustain the environment) 0.406 0.177 0.344 0.009 -0.064 -0.037 -0.358 -0.423 -0.265 -0.075 0.546
Q11 (Don’t prohibit pornography) 0.155 0.120 0.772 -0.069 -0.208 0.177 0.127 0.390 0.258 0.194 -0.114
Proportion
24.688% 16.122% 10.421% 9.590% 7.575% 6.789% 5.843% 5.280% 5.086% 4.661% 3.945%
Explained
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D Detailed results of the survey eliciting policy views
Q10 − Environmental legacy Q11 − Don't prohibit pornography
Q7 − Competition mostly good Q8 − Competition mostly harmful Q9 − Prohibit immigration
Q4 − Trust free market Q5 − Govt should tax CO2 Q6 − Raise min wage
Q1 − Govt. satisfy needs Q2 − Govt. impedes markets Q3 − Trust govt.
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5

























Figure D.1: Scoring of policy statements: beginning of the semester
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Q10 − Environmental legacy Q11 − Don't prohibit pornography
Q7 − Competition mostly good Q8 − Competition mostly harmful Q9 − Prohibit immigration
Q4 − Trust free market Q5 − Govt should tax CO2 Q6 − Raise min wage
Q1 − Govt. satisfy needs Q2 − Govt. impedes markets Q3 − Trust govt.
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5





















Figure D.2: Scoring of policy statements: end of the semester
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Q10 − Environmental legacy Q11 − Don't prohibit pornography
Q7 − Competition mostly good Q8 − Competition mostly harmful Q9 − Prohibit immigration
Q4 − Trust free market Q5 − Govt should tax CO2 Q6 − Raise min wage
Q1 − Govt. satisfy needs Q2 − Govt. impedes markets Q3 − Trust govt.
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Figure D.3: Scoring of policy statements: change during the semester
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Figure E.5: Reciprocity in the TG game (Player 2), by gender
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(c) Policy views: simple averages
Figure F.1: Effect of Intermediate Microeconomics on the social preferences, beliefs and
policy preferences of female students
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Figure G.2: Effect of Walrasian Intermediate Microeconomics on policy preferences -
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Figure G.3: Effect of Post Walrasian Intermediate Microeconomics on policy preferences
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Figure G.4: Effect of Intermediate Microeconomics – all single policy statements
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Table G.1: Difference-in-differences (DiD) estimates of the effect of Intermediate Microeconomics – Walrasian vs. Post
Walrasian curriculum
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Generosity in Generosity in Beliefs about Beliefs about Reciprocity in
Dictator Game Trust Game generosity (DG) generosity (TG) Trust Game
dfsi dg dfsi tg p2 guess dfsi dg guess dfsi tg p2 recip
Mean Before (Walras) 0.546 0.355 0.451 0.329 0.277
( 0.033) ( 0.015) ( 0.021) ( 0.014) ( 0.029)
Mean Before (Post Walras) 0.716 0.350 0.519 0.287 0.345
( 0.052) ( 0.014) ( 0.034) ( 0.020) ( 0.048)
Mean Before (Non Econ) 0.650 0.385 0.500 0.307 0.215
( 0.049) ( 0.023) ( 0.033) ( 0.022) ( 0.038)
Selection (Walras) -0.104 -0.030 -0.049 0.022 0.062
( 0.059) ( 0.028) ( 0.039) ( 0.026) ( 0.048)
Selection (Post Walras) 0.066 -0.035 0.019 -0.020 0.130
( 0.072) ( 0.027) ( 0.048) ( 0.030) ( 0.062)
Change (Walras) -0.046 -0.029 0.010 -0.033 -0.018
( 0.036) ( 0.018) ( 0.027) ( 0.017) ( 0.027)
Change (Post Walras) -0.057 -0.036 -0.022 0.006 -0.059
( 0.062) ( 0.028) ( 0.035) ( 0.025) ( 0.052)
Change (Non Econ) -0.054 -0.033 0.009 0.004 -0.025
( 0.051) ( 0.016) ( 0.036) ( 0.016) ( 0.037)
DiD (Effect of Walras) 0.008 0.005 0.001 -0.037 0.007
( 0.063) ( 0.024) ( 0.044) ( 0.023) ( 0.046)
DiD (Effect of Post Walras) -0.002 -0.003 -0.030 0.002 -0.035
( 0.080) ( 0.033) ( 0.050) ( 0.030) ( 0.063)
Standardized
DiD (Effect of Walras) 0.024 0.029 0.006 -0.251 0.024
( 0.180) ( 0.153) ( 0.201) ( 0.158) ( 0.153)
DiD (Effect of Post Walras) -0.007 -0.021 -0.138 0.017 -0.116
( 0.231) ( 0.206) ( 0.226) ( 0.201) ( 0.213)
N 388 388 388 388 388
Notes: See Section 3.3 for the definition of each outcome variable. All outcomes range from 0 (perfect self-interest) to 1 (max. possible deviation
from self-interest). ‘Mean before’ is the average of the outcome variables in the first (pre-treatment) survey round; ‘Selection’ is the difference in
‘Mean before’ between Economics and non-Economics students; ‘Change’ is the average change in the outcome variable between the first
(pre-treatment) and the second (post-treatment) survey round. ‘DiD (Effect of Econ)’ reports our DiD estimates of the effect of intermediate
microeconomics; ‘Standardized DiD (Effect of Econ)’ reports the same estimated average effect after standardizing the outcome variables.
Standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses.
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Table G.2: Difference-in-differences (DiD) estimates of the effect of Intermediate Microeconomics – Walrasian vs. Post
Walrasian curriculum (Manual Aggregation)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Pro-Market Pro-Gov’t inter-
vention
Pro-Green Trust in gov’t Immigration re-
strictive
Mean Before (Walras) 0.187 0.251 0.477 0.275 -0.320
( 0.029) ( 0.032) ( 0.039) ( 0.042) ( 0.058)
Mean Before (Post Walras) 0.041 0.443 0.682 0.270 -0.486
( 0.066) ( 0.062) ( 0.052) ( 0.098) ( 0.097)
Mean Before (Non Econ) 0.003 0.337 0.565 0.293 -0.359
( 0.046) ( 0.050) ( 0.065) ( 0.070) ( 0.095)
Selection (Walras) 0.184 -0.086 -0.088 -0.019 0.039
( 0.054) ( 0.060) ( 0.075) ( 0.082) ( 0.111)
Selection (Post Walras) 0.038 0.106 0.117 -0.023 -0.128
( 0.080) ( 0.080) ( 0.083) ( 0.120) ( 0.136)
Change (Walras) -0.017 0.042 0.034 -0.095 0.072
( 0.029) ( 0.026) ( 0.037) ( 0.043) ( 0.058)
Change (Post Walras) -0.014 0.000 -0.061 -0.095 0.135
( 0.037) ( 0.038) ( 0.042) ( 0.054) ( 0.094)
Change (Non Econ) 0.011 -0.000 -0.027 -0.011 -0.109
( 0.050) ( 0.045) ( 0.044) ( 0.072) ( 0.067)
DiD (Effect of Walras) -0.028 0.042 0.061 -0.084 0.181
( 0.058) ( 0.052) ( 0.057) ( 0.084) ( 0.089)
DiD (Effect of Post Walras) -0.024 0.000 -0.034 -0.084 0.244
( 0.062) ( 0.059) ( 0.061) ( 0.090) ( 0.115)
Standardized
DiD (Effect of Walras) -0.088 0.115 0.145 -0.177 0.299
( 0.182) ( 0.142) ( 0.136) ( 0.177) ( 0.147)
DiD (Effect of Post Walras) -0.077 0.000 -0.080 -0.177 0.404
( 0.196) ( 0.162) ( 0.145) ( 0.189) ( 0.191)
N 388 388 388 388 388
Notes: See Section C for the definition of each outcome variable. All outcomes range from -2 to 2. ‘Mean before’ is the average of the outcome
variables in the first (pre-treatment) survey round; ‘Selection’ is the difference in ‘Mean before’ between Economics and non-Economics students;
‘Change’ is the average change in the outcome variable between the first (pre-treatment) and the second (post-treatment) survey round. ‘DiD
(Effect of Econ)’ reports our DiD estimates of the effect of intermediate microeconomics; ‘Standardized DiD (Effect of Econ)’ reports the same
estimated average effect after standardizing the outcome variables. Standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses.
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Table G.3: Difference-in-differences (DiD) estimates of the effect of Intermediate Microeconomics – Walrasian vs. Post
Walrasian curriculum (PCA Aggregation)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Left-Right Pro market Libertarian Communitarian
Mean Before (Walras) 0.286 0.256 -0.114 -0.028
( 0.147) ( 0.124) ( 0.106) ( 0.091)
Mean Before (Post Walras) -0.658 -0.120 0.068 -0.094
( 0.277) ( 0.233) ( 0.161) ( 0.180)
Mean Before (Non Econ) -0.240 -0.418 -0.113 0.015
( 0.222) ( 0.214) ( 0.159) ( 0.154)
Selection (Walras) 0.526 0.674 -0.000 -0.043
( 0.266) ( 0.247) ( 0.191) ( 0.179)
Selection (Post Walras) -0.418 0.297 0.181 -0.110
( 0.355) ( 0.316) ( 0.226) ( 0.237)
Change (Walras) -0.092 -0.060 0.166 0.104
( 0.115) ( 0.137) ( 0.103) ( 0.117)
Change (Post Walras) 0.165 -0.081 0.233 -0.032
( 0.122) ( 0.175) ( 0.123) ( 0.163)
Change (Non Econ) -0.083 0.047 0.010 0.157
( 0.177) ( 0.209) ( 0.126) ( 0.172)
DiD (Effect of Walras) -0.009 -0.107 0.156 -0.053
( 0.211) ( 0.250) ( 0.163) ( 0.208)
DiD (Effect of Post Walras) 0.248 -0.128 0.223 -0.189
( 0.215) ( 0.273) ( 0.176) ( 0.237)
Standardized
DiD (Effect of Walras) -0.006 -0.080 0.146 -0.052
( 0.128) ( 0.186) ( 0.153) ( 0.202)
DiD (Effect of Post Walras) 0.150 -0.095 0.209 -0.184
( 0.130) ( 0.203) ( 0.165) ( 0.231)
N 388 388 388 388
Notes: See Section C for the definition of each outcome variable. All outcomes range from -2 to 2. ‘Mean before’ is the average of the outcome
variables in the first (pre-treatment) survey round; ‘Selection’ is the difference in ‘Mean before’ between Economics and non-Economics students;
‘Change’ is the average change in the outcome variable between the first (pre-treatment) and the second (post-treatment) survey round. ‘DiD
(Effect of Econ)’ reports our DiD estimates of the effect of intermediate microeconomics; ‘Standardized DiD (Effect of Econ)’ reports the same
estimated average effect after standardizing the outcome variables. Standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses.
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H Attitude extremity
In order to check if economics has a moderating effect on students’ policy opinions,
we construct attitude extremity indexes as in Makowsky and Miller (2014). For each





Here xi is the observation, xmid is the middle point in the Likert scale and xmax is the
most extreme value in the Likert scale. Each Ei is therefore the deviation from the middle
point in the respondent’s answered question, as a percentage of the maximum possible
distance. These extremity measures are then aggregated by taking simple averages of
questions grouped based on a common topic. We also took a simple average of all the
policy questions together.
Figure H.1 shows the effect of Intermediate Microeconomics on attitude extremity
in policy opinions of students. Even though economics students tend to have more
extreme pro-market opinions, the effect of a course in Intermediate Microeconomics has
little to no effect on attitude extremity. The only partial exception is the question about
immigration, on which economics seems to have some moderating effect, although rather
imprecisely estimated. However, this just seems to capture the movement of economics
students towards a less unfavorable view of restrictive immigration policies that has been
described in Section 4.3, rather than an independent moderating effect. Indeed, we find
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Figure H.1: Effect of Intermediate Microeconomics on the extremity in policy opinions
of students
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